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Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016)
Emily Slike
Tension has long existed between states and the federal oversight
invoked throughout the western United States. While courts have clarified
some, there are still questions about the oversight the federal government
should be afforded. In Sturgeon v. Frost, the Supreme Court left the hard
questions of state sovereignty and federal land management to the lower
appellate courts. However, the Court ruled that Alaska will continue to
remain the exception to the rule and that Alaskan conservation system
units can be treated differently than other federally managed preservation
land throughout the rest of the country.
I. INTRODUCTION
The historical tension between federal and state control of
federally managed preservation land continued when the United States
Supreme Court examined how Alaska National Interest Lands and
Conservation Act’s (“ANICLA”) affected the National Park Service’s
(“NPS”) control of federal lands in Sturgeon v. Frost.1 The issue
concerned Alaska resident John Sturgeon’s use of a hovercraft on an
Alaskan river within a system unit, managed by the NPS, which bans
hovercraft use.2 However, Alaska law permits activities that are important
to Alaskans, including hovercraft use.3 Sturgeon argued that § 103(c) of
ANICLA prohibited the NPS from regulating “non-public” land in Alaska
because the Nation River is owned by Alaska through the Submerged
Lands Act, which transferred title and ownership of submerged lands and
waters to the state.4 The NPS argued that, under the reserved water rights
doctrine, “it has title to an interest” within the Yukon-Charley Rivers
National Preserve System Unit (“Yukon-Charley”) boundaries, a unit
where the Nation River flows through.5
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the
NPS had the authority to enforce regulations over all federally-owned
lands, waters, and national park navigable waterways administered by the
NPS nationally.6 The Ninth Circuit held that because the hovercraft ban
does not apply “solely” to the conservation system units in Alaska, the
NPS retained authority for hovercraft regulation enforcement.7 The
Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded remaining questions

1.
136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016).
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Id. at 1062.
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Id. at 1066.
4.
Id. at 1068 (citing Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
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regarding “public” and “non-public” lands and future management
authority.8
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
When the United States purchased Alaska in 1867, 98 percent of
the state’s 365 million acres were federally owned, resulting in an absence
of federal land grants to the State.9 In 1958, the Alaska Statehood Act
allowed Alaska to choose 103 million acres of federal land to become
state-owned allowing for maximum land use “consistent with public
interest.”10 After failed attempts to secure additional acreage for state
control, Congress passed ANICLA in 1980.11 ANICLA reserved 104
million acres of land for preservation and specified that the NPS could not
ban activities of particular importance to Alaskans on such lands.12
ANICLA’s two goals were: (1) to allow for ample protection of Alaskan
public land’s “scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values” and (2)
to allow for opportunity and satisfaction of Alaska and its people’s
economic and social needs.13 Under ANICLA, preserved lands were
placed in “conservation system units” which included “any unit in Alaska
of the National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National
Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails System, National
Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument.”14
In the fall of 2007, Sturgeon was using his hovercraft for moose
hunting on the Nation River when NPS Rangers told Sturgeon that
hovercraft use in the Yukon-Charley was forbidden.15 Sturgeon protested,
saying the regulation was not applicable because the river was Stateowned, but complied with the order to remove his hovercraft from the
area.16 Apprehensive of criminal prosecution if he continued to use his
hovercraft, Sturgeon sued the NPS and several officials in the United
States District Court for the District of Alaska, with Alaska intervening in
support of Sturgeon.17 Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief
permitting the use of hovercrafts within the Yukon-Charley boundaries.18
Summary judgment was granted to the NPS, and the Ninth Circuit partially
affirmed.19
Further examination of 54 U.S.C. § 100751 was required to
determine if § 103(c) creates an exception to the NPS’s general authority.20
8.
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Id.
Id. (citing Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 1).
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First, the Court examined if § 103(c) addressed the extent of the Park
Service’s authority over lands within the boundaries of conservation
system units in Alaska.21 The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to
recommend regulations regarding “boating and other activities on or
related to water located within System units, including water subject to
United States jurisdiction.”22 System units are “any area of land and water
administered by the Secretary, acting through the Director of the NPS, for
park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.”23 The
hovercraft ban was adopted under 54 U.S.C. § 100751(b) and has effect
throughout all federally controlled preservation areas.24 Section 103(c)
provides that “only lands, waters, and interests therein to which the United
States has title are considered public land included as a portion of the
Alaska conservation system units.” 25
Sturgeon, relying on federal land management history, asserted
that the NPS was prohibited from regulating “non-public” land as if the
land was federally owned.26 The first part of Sturgeon’s argument was that
the Nation River is owned by Alaska and therefore cannot be “public”
land.27 The second prong of Sturgeon’s argument was that the Nation
River is not part of the Yukon-Charley, therefore the NPS lacks regulation
authority due to § 103(c)’s second sentence that states no lands conveyed
by Alaska… “before, on, or after December 2, 1980 shall be subject to the
regulations applicable solely to public lands within the units.”28 Sturgeon’s
argument concluded that because the hovercraft ban is a regulation over
federally controlled preservation areas, and not a generally applicable law,
the NPS cannot enforce the ban.29
The NPS argued its longstanding authority to regulate waters
within federally managed preservation areas, and that § 103(c) does not
remove that authority.30 The NPS maintained that the United States has
title to an interest in the water within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley
under the reserved water rights doctrine.31 The doctrine states that when
the federal government removes land from public domain to reserve it for
a federal purpose, it reserves then unappropriated water needed to
accomplish the reservation’s purpose.32 The NPS concluded its argument
stating that the regulation is not solely for public lands, so the ban’s
enforcement is not prevented.33
21.
Id.
22.
Id. (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100751(b) (2014)).
23.
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24.
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Id. at 1068.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. at 1069.
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Id.
32.
Id. (citing Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138, 96 S. Ct.
2062, 48 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1976)).
33.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit adopted its own interpretation of § 103(c),
determining the phrase “regulations applicable solely to public lands
within such units” differentiates between the NPS regulations applying
solely to public lands in Alaska, and the NPS regulations applying to
federally managed preservation areas across the country.34 The court
further reasoned that the NPS could enforce nationally applicable
regulations on “public” and “non-public” property within Alaska’s system
boundaries because the regulations do not only apply to public lands
within the units.35 Additionally, the NPS may not apply Alaska-specific
regulations to “non-public” lands within the boundaries of the units.36 In
sum, because the hovercraft ban applies to all lands administered by the
NPS, and all navigable waters lying within National Parks, the hovercraft
ban is not solely applicable to the Alaskan units.37 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit found that the NPS authority exists to enforce the hovercraft ban.38
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s § 103(c)
interpretation, and found the view inconsistent with ANICLA’s text and
context as a whole.39 The Court took issue with the Ninth Circuit’s reading
which seemed “plausible in the abstract,” but not in reality.40 The Court
discussed how ANICLA creates many exceptions, specific to Alaska, to
the NPS’s general authority over federally controlled preservation areas.41
Of these, the most applicable exception outlines that “National Preserves
‘in Alaska shall be administered and managed as a unit of the National
Park System in the same manner as a national park except as otherwise
provided in this Act and except that the taking of fish and wildlife for sport
purposes and subsistence uses, and trapping shall be allowed’ pursuant to
applicable law.”42
The Court continued to recognize that Alaska is “often the
exception, not the rule,” and found the Ninth Circuit’s reading prevented
the NPS from recognizing Alaska’s uniqueness.43 Under the Ninth
Circuit’s “topsy-turvy” reading, the NPS could regulate “non-public”
lands in Alaska only by rules valid outside of Alaska.44
Additionally, § 103(c) distinguishes “non-public” and “public”
lands within system units.45 If the Ninth Circuit’s reading was followed,
34.
35.
36.
37.
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44.
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in differentiating between “public” and “non-public” land the NPS would
have to regulate “non-public” land by rules enforced outside Alaska, and
“public” lands following Alaska-specific provisions.46 If the NPS had
authority over “non-public” Alaska lands, an implausible reading of §
103(c) arises.47 When the Court examined ANICLA with special
consideration given to § 103(c), it considered the possibility of all
conservation unit land being treated differently than other federally
controlled preservation areas.48 The Court additionally contemplated that
within the boundaries “non-public” and “public” lands may be treated
differently.49 Because Alaskan system lands could not be treated
differently, and managing “public” and “non-public” lands within the units
would require further measures, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
§ 103(c) interpretation, vacated the judgement, and remanded the
remaining issues.50
The arguments not inspected by the Court included: (1) deciding
if the Nation River is “public” land under ANICLA because the issue
touches on vital state sovereignty and federal authority issues, (2) deciding
if the NPS has authority under 54 U.S.C. § 100751(b) to regulate
Sturgeon’s activities on the Nation River, even if the river is not
determined to be “public” land, or if ANICLA limits the NPS’s authority,
and (3) NPS’s alternative argument that under ANICLA it has authority
over “public” and “non-public” lands within Alaskan unit areas, to the
extent a regulation is written applying specifically to both kinds of land.
IV. CONCLUSION
The outcome in Sturgeon can be viewed as a victory for Alaska’s
uniqueness regarding federal management of preservation areas. But this
victory is dampened by the Court’s refusal to address issues regarding the
classification of “public” and “non-public” lands within system units,
leaving questions about federal management and the NPS’s authority over
such lands unknown. While the Court once again established the
individuality of Alaska’s land, large questions concerning the battle
between state sovereignty and federal management will not be answered
until a decision by the Ninth Circuit further clarifies the issues between
state and federal land management.
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